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Governing the Shift: Transformation Dividends, Systemic Risks and New Uncertainties 
Andreas Goldthau, Martin Keim and Kirsten Westphal 
The transformation of the energy system is a global phenomenon, but the process 
itself is still progressing far too slowly to halt climate change. However, for “human 
security”, it has immediate positive effects. An energy system that is increasingly 
electrifying offers reduced dependence on fossil fuel supply chains and strengthens 
access to energy, thus serving as an economic factor that indirectly promotes national 
and international security. However, the perceivable geographical concentration 
of technology leadership and an imbalance in global finance raise new threats. These 
may translate into veritable geopolitical risks that require global cooperation in 
order to be overcome. 
 
The global energy transformation – is par-
ticularly evident in the expansion of renew-
able energies, and it is being helped by fall-
ing costs. In 2017, around €300 billion was 
invested in renewables worldwide (com-
pared with €700 billion for oil and gas), and 
174 countries have committed themselves 
to making voluntary contributions within 
the framework of the Paris Agreement 
(2015). Energy consumption is responsible 
for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas 
emissions. In order to stop climate change, 
it is therefore crucial to decarbonise the 
energy system. Geopolitically, the energy 
transformation is reinforcing a shift that 
has already commenced – away from tra-
ditional security policy and geographical 
spheres of influence towards the control of 
the flow of goods, knowledge, capital, and 
information. 
A systemic change  
The energy transformation essentially im-
plies a systemic shift, the effects of which 
must not be underestimated. Three factors 
are key in this context:  
∎ The energy transformation recalibrates 
value chains. In a low-hydrocarbon – 
i.e. decarbonised – energy system, the 
economic value is no longer generated 
primarily from the (fossil) resource. 
Rather, it is accrued at the stage of con-
version into end-use energy and energy 
services. This, in turn, means that the 
ability to generate profits will hinge on 
the availability and use of low-carbon 
technologies. 
∎ The energy transformation will yield new 
energy spaces, defined by infrastructure, 
production chains, and industrial clus-
ters. This spatial effect results from (geo-) 
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technological change, for example in the 
shape of local micro grids or region-span-
ning super grids, such as those promoted 
by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
∎ Today’s focus still rests on individual 
sectors (i.e. electricity, buildings, trans-
port, industry), each characterised by a 
dominant mix of (fossil) fuels. The future 
focus, by contrast, will be in sector cou-
pling. Integrating electricity, heat, and 
mobility will reinforce the relocation 
and reconfiguration of energy spaces. 
From a global perspective, the low-
carbon transformation is likely to render 
the energy system more sustainable, but 
also much more heterogeneous. The con-
ventional energy system, as it exists today, 
has been gradually shaped over a long 
period of time by global trade in crude oil, 
coal, and liquefied natural gas as well as by 
the combustion engine, which dominates 
transport. Therefore, it is relatively homog-
enous in nature. With the transformation 
of energy systems, however, the specific 
characteristics of individual countries and 
regions come to the fore more prominently. 
It is the geographical position (and the re-
newable energy endowment); the – often 
differing – political ambitions and state 
capabilities; national preferences in the 
energy mix (e.g. renewables, nuclear ener-
gy, or the use of gas); as well as the different 
approaches in the mobility sector that will 
determine the shape of a specific system. 
Key technologies are moving to the 
centre of the energy transformation. Going 
forward, economic growth will rest on 
“technology rents”, and these could become 
the decisive driver for the future welfare of 
societies, but also the success of the global 
transformation of energy systems. A pre-
condition here is that states cooperate. If 
they do not, the result may well be a race to 
the bottom and national unilateralism. This 
is the ambivalence that characterises the 
geoeconomics of the ongoing shift within 
global energy systems. 
Major benefit: 
A global security dividend 
Undoubtedly, the central contribution of 
energy system transformation is the slow-
ing of global warming. But decarbonisation 
also has far-reaching, positive effects for 
human security, such as improving air 
and water quality, and thus public health. 
Access to clean and safe energy is crucial 
for green growth. Citibank estimates that 
active climate investment and green growth 
will generate a net economic gain of $1.8 
trillion by 2040. In developing countries, 
access to electricity is a prerequisite or 
multiplier for social and economic develop-
ment. Today, 1.1 billion people still have no 
access to electricity. The energy transforma-
tion will successively reduce dependence 
on imports and the risks posed by perilous 
price volatility, thereby contributing to-
wards reducing or avoiding conflicts over 
fossil fuels. In the long term, the market 
power of today’s oligopolies, such as the 
new OPEC+ oil alliance, may fade away. 
Hence, the energy transformation also 
promises a “security dividend”. If more 
energy is produced locally, this has an im-
pact on the relations between producer, 
transit, and consumer countries, arguably 
rendering the latter less dependent on the 
former. This goes hand in hand with an 
increase in sovereignty over energy supply. 
The electrification of the system also 
levels out the role of states in the interna-
tional arena, as they all become “prosum-
ers”, i.e. producers and consumers alike. In 
addition, states may well become part of 
an encompassing “grid community”. This 
obviously requires conscious political deci-
sions, both with regard to the domestic 
expansion or importing of renewables and 
to common control and cooperation mecha-
nisms for the exchange of electricity in the 
grid. A single grid implies that vulnerabili-
ties and sensitivities are distributed among 
all participating parties.  
The need to defend critical infrastructure 
presents NATO with new challenges. This 
will likely also influence the discussion on 
burden-sharing in the alliance, as the ob-
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jects of protection will shift geographically 
and change in substance, for example from 
sea passages and choke points to power grids. 
New uncertainties 
Securing these transformation dividends 
also comes with new risks and challenges. 
For instance, the electrification of the ener-
gy system is associated with considerable 
risks in the area of grid stability and cyber 
security. A breakdown of the power supply 
would have cascading effects for other 
critical infrastructure. The geopolitical 
implications will arguably have less of an 
effect on the defence and security realms. 
Rather, the flows within “energy ecosys-
tems” and of network and energy services, 
data, technologies, and supply chains will 
become crucial. Controlling and governing 
these flows is likely to become an increas-
ingly critical task. 
What is more, the energy transformation 
is developing quite unevenly across the 
globe. As global value chains re-scale, pro-
duction clusters relocate to the local level, 
and flows of goods change, there is a direct 
impact on the international division of 
labour and the world trading system. About 
one-fifth of global trade volumes are com-
prised of products from the extracting 
industry, such as oil, gas, and coal. To the 
extent that energy supply becomes more 
of a technology- and innovation-driven 
process, states will therefore be affected in 
their participation in world trade, recali-
brating welfare creation and generating 
profound consequences for the world eco-
nomic system. 
For the 2°C target to be achieved, some 
80 per cent of the world’s coal, one-third 
of the oil, and half of the gas reserves will 
have to remain in the ground. The far-
reaching consequences for financial mar-
kets are illustrated in the debate about 
stranded assets, i.e. fossil fuel-related invest-
ments that will have to be written off pre-
maturely due to decarbonisation.  
Assets linked to fossil fuels represent up 
to 30 per cent of the capitalisation of inter-
national financial centres, such as the 
London Stock Exchange. Depending on the 
depreciation rate, this clearly will represent 
a systemic risk. 
Geopolitically, the restructuring of the 
energy system will not threaten the major 
oil and gas producers, such as the Gulf 
States and Russia, as quickly and existen-
tially as is generally assumed. Even as the 
industrialised countries are decarbonising, 
demand for oil and natural gas is likely to 
remain high for some time, thanks to con-
sumption in China, India, and other devel-
oping economies flattening out only slowly. 
The much-discussed access to lithium, 
cobalt, and “rare earths”, which are crucial 
for producing batteries, energy-saving 
lamps, wind turbines, and electric motors, 
is also a less severe problem in the long 
term. Price incentives will eventually in-
crease supply and broaden the resource 
base. Increased recycling rates and a firm 
move towards a closed raw materials cycle 
will pay off. 
This begs the question of how to foster 
prosperity and green growth in a low-
carbon future. The key to success will lie in 
low-carbon technologies, as the technology 
rents that they yield will be the determin-
ing factor for societal welfare and prosperity. 
To some extent, the global transformation 
of energy systems has already become sub-
ject to classic industrial policy. A spectre of 
non-cooperative, mercantilist competition 
and policy uncertainty is looming, as epito-
mised by calls for “America First” and an 
accelerating global trend to serving alleged 
“national interests”. As the EU tariffs on 
Chinese solar panels show, fierce industrial 
competition is already underway today in 
the realm of renewable energies. States 
could be tempted to further strengthen 
their hands and control over high-end tech-
nology so as to secure their “competitive 
edge” and to (re-)nationalize parts of the 
global value chain. 
To make matters worse, patents for key 
technologies in the fields of smart grids, off-
shore wind, and composite materials are 
almost exclusively held by OECD countries 
and China. Around 90 per cent of invest-
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ments in renewable energies are also cur-
rently being made in this “new Global 
North”. Developing countries, on the other 
hand, run the risk of being cut out of 
capital flows and technological advances, 
notwithstanding the fact that the greatest 
growth in energy demand will happen in 
the Global South. Digitalisation can exacer-
bate these trends even further. This emerg-
ing imbalance in the global energy trans-
formation needs to be addressed. 
Governance matters 
The global energy transformation is tanta-
mount to systemic change. It yields a trans-
formation dividend that is most evident in 
global climate protection and human secu-
rity. The shift towards a sustainable energy 
system also means direct gains for societies 
and economies through local value creation 
and indirect benefits for current consumer 
nations, stemming from reduced import 
dependency. 
For Germany and the EU, these changing 
geoeconomics are an opportunity, as eco-
nomics to some extent crowd out (geo)poli-
tics in international relations. Countries 
going it alone will endure higher costs and 
lower levels of effectiveness. Germany – 
the country of the ‘Energiewende’, a leader in 
climate and renewable energy policy, and 
traditionally a multilateral player – should 
continue to firmly promote the advantages 
of international cooperation such as cost-
effectiveness and co-benefits for human 
security. Germany’s non-permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council from 2019 to 2020 
offers an ideal framework for (concerted) 
action, and for highlighting the intertwined 
nature of the global energy transformation 
and “climate and security” – one of the 
country’s priorities for the period. 
To be sure, a heterogeneous, fragmented 
energy system would neatly fit an increas-
ingly multipolar world order underpinned 
by a more protectionist stance towards trade. 
Yet, mercantilist energy policies present the 
threat of spiralling rivalries between “ener-
gy blocks”, as states strive to “privatise” com-
petitive advantages and technology rents. 
This makes multilateral cooperation an in-
dispensable policy goal in order to radically 
and rapidly restructure the energy system 
worldwide. Sustainable and long-term trans-
formation dividends can only be reaped if 
a liberal trade regime secures transnational 
supply chains and guarantees access to tech-
nology and know-how. As an industrial 
country, Germany is therefore called upon 
to strengthen international cooperation in 
the global energy transformation, not least 
with a view towards ensuring its own eco-
nomic base in the long term. The crisis-
ridden WTO will resume a central position 
in these efforts, as the green technologies 
of tomorrow are within its remit (unlike 
today’s fossil fuels). 
Within the framework of the EU, Ger-
many should work towards facilitating 
technology transfer and cushioning politi-
cal risk premiums that could prevent sus-
tainable investment, particularly in non-
OECD nations. Germany should use its 
2020 EU Presidency to generate the political 
momentum for further developing tailored 
governance mechanisms. At the global level, 
it is important to inject more transparency 
into decarbonisation pathways and to foster 
exchange – not only with the major con-
sumer countries, but also with traditional 
energy producers – on the pace at which 
the energy system is upgraded, energy effi-
ciency is increased, and renewable energy 
is brought in. 
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